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Despite being enthusiastic about China’s remarkable economic growth 
since 1979, many firms from developed countries and their governments 
are concerned that China still lacks an effective commercial code to deal 
with disputes between Chinese and foreign firms. Although the Chinese 
government joined the World Trade Organization and promised to respect 
universal commercial rules and customs, it has still not yet established its 
own legal system to deal with Sino-foreign civil and commercial disputes. 
Therefore, the process of how Chinese civil law and its commercial code are 
being realized remains of interest.
One of the most striking commercial issues that occurs between China 
and developed countries is how to protect the intellectual property of foreign 
firms in China. Since many foreign firms have had their trademarks and patents 
infringed by Chinese firms, they have requested that their governments nego-
tiate with the Chinese authorities to establish an effective regulatory system 
to protect their intellectual property. As intellectual property rights became 
an increasingly hot issue, a number of specialists in Chinese law in English-
speaking countries noticed that there was a precedent for such a system in 
the Republican period: the trademark law of 1923.1 However, since they have 
mainly been interested in the current situation and in future developments, 
they have left aside historical questions regarding the stipulations of the earlier 
law and to what extent it was effective.
The promulgation of the Chinese trademark law in 1923 was the outcome of 
long negotiations between the Chinese government, the Japanese government 
and Western governments led by the British government, and was intended to 
settle trademark infringement disputes caused by Chinese merchants from the 
1890s.2 Only recently have a number of Chinese researchers started to look into 
this question.3 However, since they have only consulted Chinese documents, 
they have not fully revealed the historical context of the promulgation of the 
law and its far-reaching effects.4 In order to reveal the complete process behind 
the first trademark law of 1923, researchers also need to consult sources from 
Japan and Britain, the two major foreign governments whose commercial poli-
1  See William P. Alford, To Steal a Book is 
an Elegant Offence: Intellectual Property Law 
in Chinese Civilization (Palo Alto: Stanford 
University Press, 1995), pp.41–55; Leah Chan 
Grinvald, “Making Much Ado About Theory: 
The Chinese Trademark Law,” Michigan Tele-
communications and Technology Law Review 
15.1(2008): 53–106, at p.73.
2  This article is a part of my research concern-
ing “the development of the foreign trademark 
protection system in Republican China,” for 
which research funds were provided from 
Waseda University in 2004, the Seimeikai (清明
会) Fund in 2005 and the Japanese Ministry of 
Education and Science in 2006 (No.A06114600).
3  Foreign trademark infringement by Chinese 
merchants was raised as an item on the agenda 
for the first time during the negotiations be-
tween Great Britain and China for the revision 
of the treaty of Tianjin in 1902. This process was 
dealt with in Li Yongsheng, Qingmo zhongwai 
xiuding shangye jaoshe yanjiu [Study of the 
Negotiation of Sino-foreign Commercial Treaty 
Revision in late Qing Period] (Tianjin: Nankai 
daxue chubanshe, 2005), pp.272–77. 
4  Zhao Yukun, “Minguo shiqi de shangbiao 
lifa yü shangbiao baohu” [Registration and 
Protection on Trademarks in the Period of 
Republic of China] Lishi dang’an [Historical 
Archives] August 2003.3: 119–24, 133, at 
pp.120–1; Zuo Xuchu, Zhongguo shangbiao 
falüshi: Jin xiandai bufen [History of Chinese 
Trademark Law: The Modern Era] (Beijing: 
Zhishi chanquan chubanshe: 2005) Chapter 3. 
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cies most influenced the Chinese government at the time. In this article 
unpublished material such as Chinese government records in the Insti-
tute of Modern History (hereafter IMH), Academia Sinica, the records 
of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Nihon Gaimushô Kiroku 
[hereafter NGK]), the British government’s unpublished diplomatic 
records in the National Archive (FO228)5 and the North-China Herald 
(hereafter NCH) has been used. By doing so this article attempts to 
reveal the complete process of the promulgation of the 1923 trademark 
law in the context of Anglo-Japanese demands to establish a favorable 
trademark registration system for foreign firms, as well as to examine 
how the Chinese government responded to these demands and how 
foreign firms in China reacted to the 1923 trademark law.6
Anglo-Japanese Conflicts, 1902-06
Anglo-Japanese conflicts surrounding the establishment of the 
trademark registration system started when Japanese firms challenged 
Western (particularly British) firms, which had been taking the lion’s 
share of the import market in China from the early twentieth century 
onwards. Due to the relatively primitive level of their technology com-
pared to companies from Western countries, Japanese industrial firms 
could not compete with Western firms by selling better quality goods 
at cheaper prices in China. Instead, they engaged in manufacturing 
counterfeits of the goods of Western firms and thereby infringed on 
their trademarks, and in this they were supported by the Japanese 
government. Despite strong protests from the French government and 
frequent requests from Great Britain and Switzerland, the Japanese 
government refused to become party to the Madrid Arrangement for 
the Suppression of False and Misleading Indications of Origin. In a 
letter of October 1910 from the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Komura Jutarō 小村寿太郎, to the Japanese Minister of Agriculture and 
Commerce, Ōura Kanetake 大浦兼武, this attitude is explained as follows:
Japanese industry is still at the stage of copying and imitation. Average 
domestic consumers prefer foreign products, for which reason a number 
of domestic producers label their goods misleadingly as foreign. Japanese 
industry is still in its infancy and has little experience with exporting, so 
confidence in its products is low and it is very difficult to find markets for 
goods labelled “made in Japan” therefore misleading indications of origin 
are not infrequent. For these reasons, to join the Agreement and to adopt 
the aforementioned Acts would be of very little practical use for promoting 
the Japanese economy, but would rather be an impediment.7
At the same time, however, due to China’s own “stage of copying and 
imitation,” Japanese industrial firms themselves suffered trademark infringe-
ment by Chinese manufacturers, who produced and sold counterfeits with 
forged trademarks. In order to justify their manufacturing counterfeits of 
Western products and yet prohibiting Chinese merchants from copying Japa-
nese products, the most advantageous method for Japan would have been 
to transfer its own trademark law into China, based on the principle of first-
to-file. Such an attempt came about when the Ministry of Commerce of the 
Qing 清 central government asked the Japanese government to help it to 
introduce a trademark law according to the treaties of commerce and naviga-
tion with Great Britain, the US and Japan from 1902 to 1903. The Japanese 
government sent two members of their Patent Bureau staff to design the 
5 Permission for the reproduction and quota-
tion of unpublished crown-copyright mate-
rial in this article has been granted by the 
Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office.
6 This article is an enlarged version of my 
Chinese paper, “Cong waiguo shili laikan 
de zhongguo shangbiao fa (1923) de yiyi 
[Significance of Chinese Trademark Law 
(1923) Seen From the Foreign Powers’ Side – 
yi riben・yingguo wei zhongxin,” [Especially 
with Japan and Great Britain] presented to 
Zhongguo shangye shi zhi luntan [Chinese 
Business History Forum], University of Hong 
Kong, 28 November 2008. 
7 Tokkyo chō [Japanese Patent Bureau] ed, 
Tokkyo seido 70 nen shi [70 Years of the 
Patent System] (Tokyo: Tokkyo chō, 1955), 
pp.103–4.
Figure 1
“Crocodile” Brand of Sir Elkanah 
Armitage & Sons Ltd. Source: Manches-
ter Guardian, July 3, 1908 re-quoted 
from FO228/2608 John N. Jordan to 
FO No. 378, Aug. 21, 1908.
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Provisional Code of Trademark Registration (Shangbiao zhuce shiban 
zhangzheng 商標註冊試辦章程) in 1905. Just before their departure 
to China, the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, Kiyoura Keigo 
清浦奎吾, instructed them to transfer the first-to-file principle into the 
Qing code.
Assuming that the Provisional Code of Trademark Registration would 
be quickly put into force, the Japanese government urged Japanese 
firms in China to carry out a provisional registration procedure at the 
Maritime Customs in Shanghai 上海 and Tianjin 天津, where trademark 
bureaus had been established according to the treaties of commerce 
and navigation with the above three countries. If the arrangement had 
played out as they had hoped, Japanese firms would have ensured the 
legitimacy of their provisionally registered trademarks (many of which 
included forgeries or counterfeits), prior to the registration of the genu-
ine trademarks of Western firms, which had been used in China from 
before the 1890s. 
Western ministries and firms, led by the British, fiercely opposed 
the plan. Due to their protests, the Qing government postponed put-
ting the Provisional Code of Trademark Registration into force in 1906.8 
What made the British government and firms aware of the intentions of 
their Japanese counterparts was the 1906 trademark infringement case 
Sir Elkanah Armitage & Sons Ltd. v. Konishi Hanbei 小西半兵衛. This 
had started when Alexander Ross & Co., an agent company of Armit-
ages (a Manchester cotton firm) in Japan, discovered that a forgery of 
their “Crocodile” trademark (see Figure 1) had been registered with the 
Japanese Patent Bureau. The British firm had registered its “Crocodile” 
trademark in 1886 at the British Trademark Bureau (no. 49375), and 
used it on drilling products exported to China. Alexander Ross & Co. 
engaged Hutchison & Co., the agent of Sir Elkanah Armitage & Sons 
Ltd. in Yokohama 横浜, to investigate the case.9
Konishi Hanbei, who registered the forgery of the “Crocodile” trademark, 
was a prominent cotton goods manufacturer in Osaka 大阪. After registering 
his own “Wanijirushi” 鰐印 trademark (see Figure 2) with the Japanese Patent 
Bureau in 1903, he applied for provisional registration in China in the following 
year immediately after the Provisional Code of Trademark Registration was put 
into force. He put this trademark on low-class T-cloth cotton goods for export 
to Korea and northern China via a Chinese immigrant dealer in Kobe 神戸, 
earning approximately 300 to 400 thousand yen per year.10
Rejecting the demand to withdraw both the registration in Japan and 
the provisional registration of the Wanijirushi trademark in China, Konishi 
threatened to banish goods with the Crocodile trademark from the import 
goods market in China unless Sir Elkanah Armitage & Sons Ltd. bought 
the right to use his own trademark at a high price.11 His defiant attitude 
was based upon Article 10 of the Japanese trademark law of 1899, which 
stipulated that any trademark which had been used for three years with 
no protest from any other party since registration became irrevocable and 
could not be rendered invalid. In response, the British side stiffened its 
attitude. Based on a request from the Manchester Chamber of Commerce 
through the British government, in May 1907 Henry Crofton Lowther, the 
British ambassador in Japan, demanded from the Japanese government that 
it would declare the registration of Konishi’s trademark invalid and prevent 
Japanese merchants from registering similar forgeries, even if that meant 
amending the trademark law.12
8  The full detail of the process was dealt 
with in my Japanese article, “Kōsho shinseiki 
shōhyō hogo seido no zasetsu to nichiei 
tairitsu” [“Anglo-Japanese Conflict and the 
Failure of the Trademark Registration Law 
during the Guangxu New Policy Period”] 
Shakai-Keizaishigaku [Socio-Economic 
History], 74.3 (Sept. 2008): 3–22.
9 NGK 3.5.6.2. Official No.52 Nagataki Hisa-
kichi 永瀧久吉 to Hayashi Tadasu 林董, with 
Enclosures, 10 February 1906; FO228/2605 
Enclosure in Mr. Hosie’s Despatch, Separate, 
of 2 November 1906.
10  NGK 3.5.6.2. Enclosure in No.212: Oda 
Hajime 織田一 to Ishii Kikujirō 石井菊次
郎, 28 June 1907; ibid., No.629 Nagataki 
Hisakichi to Katō Takaaki 加藤高明, 




Source: Manchester Guardian, 
July 3, 1908 in 
FO228/2608 John N. Jordan to FO 
No. 378, Aug. 21, 1908.
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The Japanese government responded in a rather complicated way. 
Although it officially turned down the request referring to Article 10 of the 
Japanese trademark law, it was clearly aware that Konishi’s trademark was 
a forgery of the Crocodile. Two months later, the Japanese government 
suggested to the British ambassador that Sir Elkanah Armitage & Sons 
Ltd. request that Konishi’s trademark be rendered invalid according to 
other articles of the Japanese trademark law.13 Through an unidentified 
member of staff named simply “Adachi,” the Japanese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs clandestinely advised the British ambassador on how to render the 
registration of the Wanijirushi trademark invalid based on Article 2, Section 
3 and Article 11, Section 1 of the same law. These two articles provided 
for the refusal of registration of any trademarks designed to deceive the 
public or which contained any misrepresentation as to the place of origin. 
Therefore, if Sir Elkanah Armitage & Sons Ltd. could produce evidence to 
prove that Konishi’s Wanijirushi trademark was not appropriate and was in 
fact intended to deceive the public, and if the Japanese Trademark Bureau 
could confirm the claim on examination, the bureau would cancel the 
registered mark no matter how long it might have been registered.14 The 
British side followed this advice. 
Seeing the British side preparing to take action as it had advised, the 
Japanese government approached Konishi through the Governor of Osaka. 
By pointing out the “bad effect on Japan’s foreign trade as a whole,” the 
government asked him to withdraw his trademark. Konishi eventually agreed 
on the condition that Sir Elkanah Armitage & Sons Ltd. would also withdraw 
their lawsuit. Both parties agreed, and the case was settled at the end of 1908.15
Anglo-Japanese Negotiations, 1907–09
Dealing with the Armitage case, in 1907 and 1908 British diplomats in 
China and Japan discovered that many other forgeries or counterfeits of 
the products of Western firms were manufactured in Japan and exported 
to China via Chinese dealers (see Table 1). These diplomats also revealed 
more details concerning Japanese trademark infringement. One memoran-
dum pointed out that since so many Japanese trademarks were worded in 
foreign languages, especially English, even poor imitations might be able to 
deceive purchasers since a mere resemblance would make them think they 
were looking at the original product. However, since these imitations were 
so inaccurate, they might be considered remote enough from the original 
to evade the operation of the trademark law.16 Therefore, the author of this 
memorandum proposed that it should be obligatory to state the name of the 
country of origin on Japanese products that used a foreign language on their 
trademark, in order to prevent deception.17 Another memorandum, which 
was written ten years later, pointed out that the Japanese were “extraordinar-
ily deficient both in artistic conception and in imagination,” and that, “the 
well designed and well conceived marks are of foreign origin, while the Jap-
anese ones are crude and ugly to a degree which is almost inconceivable”.18 
Apart from investigations by British diplomats, British newspapers in 
Japan and China harshly criticized the Japanese government. They claimed 
that the Japanese government allowed Japanese firms to manufacture 
counterfeits of Western firms’ goods by avoiding the mutually concluded 
convention with the British and other Western governments to protect the 
trademarks of their nations in China and Korea.19 Facing such fierce criticism, 
the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs instructed the consulates in Tianjin 
11  FO228/2605 Sir Elkanah Armitage & 
Sons Ltd. to the Secretary, Manchester 
Chamber of Commerce, 2 October 1906; 
ibid., Alexander Hosie to John N. Jordan, 
2 November 1906. 
12  FO228/2605 D45/06 John N. Jordan to Sir 
E. Grey No.469, Nov. 13, 1906; ibid. F2768 
T.W.P. Bloomfield (Board of Trade) to the 
Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 30 
March 1907; NGK 3.5.6.2. Henry Crofton 
Lowther to Viscount Tadashi Hayasu No.54, 
27 May 1907. 
13  NGK 3.5.6.2. Official No.69 Nagataki 
Hisakichi to Katō Takaaki, Mar. 1, 1906; 
ibid. Enclosure in Official No.212: Oda 
Hajime to Ishii Kikujirō, 28 June 1907; 
ibid. Hayashi Foreign Minister to the Brit-
ish Ambassador in Japan, 23 July 1907; 
FO228/2606 Sir Claude MacDonald to Sir 
E. Grey, No.167, 1 August 1907.
14  NGK 3.5.6.2. Claude M. MacDonald to 
Count Tadashi Hayashi, Mar. 24, 1908; 
FO228/2607 S. F. Crowe to Alexander 
Hosie, 2 April 1908. 
15 NGK 3.5.6.2. Takasaki Chikaaki 高崎
親章 to Nakamatsu Morio 中松盛雄, 
22 April 1908; ibid. Matsuoka Yasutake 松
岡康毅 to Hayashi Tadasu, June 22, 1908; 
ibid. Hayashi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
to the British Ambassador in Japan, Sept. 
29, 1908; ibid. Konishi Hanbei to Ogiwara 
Morikazu 荻原守一, Sept. 29, 1908; ibid. 
Ōura Kanetake 大浦兼武 to Count Komura 
Jutarō 小村寿太郎, Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs, 15 December 1908; FO228/2607 D. 
Claude MacDonald to John N. Jordan May 
13, 1908; FO228/2608 Claude MacDonald 
to Edward Grey, No.274, 22 October 1908. 
16  FO228/2606 Memorandum. Trademarks 
(Reference to Foreign Office Circular Com-
mercial 18503 of 27 June 1907). 
17  FO228/2606 Memorandum. Trademarks. 
(Reference to Foreign Office Circular Com-
mercial 18503 of 27 June 1907).
18  FO228/2751 Encl. 1 in Tokyo No.256: 
Memorandum. Japanese Trademarks in 
Japan, written by E. F. Crowe, 23 April 1917.
19  “Stealing the Hong Names of Foreign 
Firms,” The Kobe Herald cited in NGK 
3.5.6.2. 3 June 1907; “Trademarks in 
China,” NCH 21 June 1907, p.719; 23 Au-
gust 1907, pp.417–18; “Trademarks,” ibid., 
23 August 1907, pp.437–38; 13 December 
1907, pp.629–30; “Trademark Frauds,” The 
Japan Times, 30 November 1907, cited in 
FO228/2606; “Trademarks in China: Man-
chester Marks Pirated,” The Manchester 
Guardian, 3 July 1980 cited in FO228/2608; 
“Trademarks: Piracy in the Far East,” ibid., 
3 July 1980 cited in NGK 3.5.6.2. Enclosure 
in Official No.447, 18 November 1908. 
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Place & commodity Manufacturer Nationality
Hankou
Tape-measure J.Chesterman British
Cream & Glycerine Breidenbach British
Rose tooth-powder Mouson & Co. German
Savon à la Rose Mouson & Co. German
Angelica Violet Glycerine Soap G. Taussig Austrian
Jugendborn Scent Ferd Mühlens German
Lily of the Valley Scent Ferd Mühlens German
Scent J. Firaud Fils French
Luxtor Cream Vibert Frères French
Scent Géléé Frères French
Tianjin
Underwear Unknown American
Air gun Unknown American
Lantern Unknown British
Russet Cream Unknown Unknown
Shanghai
Cheling, 3 Joss Ilbert & Co.
Stag Reiss 6 Co.
Crocodile Sir Elkanah Armitage & Sons
Empress & Attendents, 
   Chinese Wine Cup 2
Scott Harding Co.
Crab Jardine Matheson & Co. Ltd
Tea carrier James Greaves Cotton Co.
Man & Fish, Woman &  
  Frog, Stags, Man & Tiger, Kirin
Ward Probst & Co.
Dalian
The Transparent Black Soap Samson & Co.
Lime Juice & Glycerine John Grosnell & Co.
Worcester Sauce
CAW’S INK, Black No specific firm
Stephen’s Blue Black Ink
H. C. Stephen’s Strongset Mucilage
Lime Cream & Glycerine
Source: FO228/2606 Hugh Fraser to John Jordan No.89, Nov. 11, 1907
Source: FO228/2606 Enlosure in Consul-General Hopkins No.66 of November 14/1907
Source: FO228/2606 Enclo. in Consul-General Sir P. Warren’s No.141 of 16 Dec. 1907
Table 1
List of Japanese-made forgeries discovered by British consulate in China
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and Shanghai to investigate the matter.20 In response, the diplomat Ozaki 
Nobumori 尾崎洵盛 reported from Shanghai that the importation of forger-
ies or counterfeits started when “cunning Chinese merchants” found several 
Japanese goods whose trademarks were coincidentally similar to those of 
Western firms. They then commissioned Osaka manufacturers (who, Ozaki 
claimed were “poor and thoughtless”) to produce the goods. The manu-
facturers in turn registered the trademarks of these counterfeits with the 
Japanese Patent Bureau under their names. As a result, according to Ozaki, 
even though this import trade was completely arranged and controlled by 
Chinese merchants, the Japanese manufacturers took the blame.21
Ozaki’s analysis cannot have been entirely true. As had become clear in 
the Armitage case, the Japanese manufacturer Konishi Hanbei was neither 
poor nor thoughtless. If Konishi had simply been an agent of “a cunning Chi-
nese merchant”, as claimed by Ozaki, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
would have recorded the name of the Chinese merchant to prove his inno-
cence. In fact, no relevant documents of the case recorded any detailed per-
sonal information about Konishi’s Chinese business partners living in Kobe.
Worried about this situation, the British Foreign Office decided to resurrect 
their once-failed plan for an Anglo-Japanese mutual convention to protect 
the trademarks of their respective nations in China and Korea, as requested 
by the China Association and Board of Trade in September 1907.22 Thus, it 
directed the British ambassador in Japan to propose this course of action to 
the Japanese government.23 In preparation, the British government revised the 
Order in Council of 1904, so that British consuls and consular courts in China 
and Korea could sue non-British subjects whose governments had signed 
mutual conventions with the British government to protect trademarks, pat-
ents and designs in China and Korea. If the British government succeeded in 
signing a mutual convention with the Japanese government, British consuls 
and consular courts in China and Korea could punish any Japanese firms that 
infringed on the intellectual property of the British, according to laws such 
as the Merchandise Marks Act of 1887, the Patents, Designs, and Trademarks 
Act, 1905 etc.24 In addition, Sir Edward Grey directed Sir Claude MacDonald, 
the British ambassador in Japan, to inform all British merchants and firms in 
East Asia to register their trademarks with the Japanese Patent Bureau so that 
no Japanese or Chinese firm could infringe on their trademarks.25
However, once again the Japanese government did not follow the course 
that the British government might have expected it to follow.26 In Article I 
of the Japanese draft of the mutual convention, the Japanese government 
declared that it would not prohibit the use of trademarks that had been 
used in China for at least three years prior to its operation.27 Moreover, in 
researching the Japanese trademark registration system, the British govern-
ment concluded that it was bound to protect all Japanese trademarks in 
China even though they were unregistered in Britain, whereas the Japanese 
government need not protect British trademarks in China unless they were 
registered in Japan, due to the difference between the legal systems in both 
countries.28 Consequently, under this scheme, even if a British firm like Sir 
Elkanah Armitage & Sons Ltd. protested against a Japanese merchant like 
Konishi Hanbei registering an imitation trademark in Japan, according to 
Article 2, Section 5 of the Japanese trademark law of 1899, the Japanese 
government would not hear the protest unless the original trademark had 
been registered at least three years before the law was put into operation.29
The British government proposed a counter draft, which clearly stipulated 
that the Japanese authorities in China and Korea were bound to protect Brit-
20  NGK 3.5.6.2. Hayashi Tadasu to Consul-
General Nagataki, No.113; Hayashi Tadasu 
to Consul-General Katō, No.86, 3 July 1907. 
21 NGK 3.5.6.2. Official No.269, Ozaki 
Nobumori to Hayashi Tadasu, 30 July 1907.
22  When the British government made the 
same proposal to Japan in 1905, the Japa-
nese government refused it. See FO17/1727 
The Marquiss of Lansdowne to Sir Ernest 
Satow No.254, 13 November 1905.
23  FO228/2606 Secretary of China Associa-
tion to H. M. Under Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, 25 July 1907; ibid., E. Grey 
to Sir J. N. Jordan No.304, 30 July 1907; ibid., 
E. Grey to Sir Claude MacDonald No.185, 
10 September 1907. 
24  “The New Orders in Council,” NCH  6 Sep-
tember 1907: pp.542–43 “Order in Council,” 
NCH 6 September 1907: pp.558–60.
25 FO228/2606 F.A. Campbell to Honor-
ary Secretary to the China Association, 
12 September 1907.
26  See my “Kōsho shinseiki shōhyō hogo 
seido no zasetsu to nichiei tairitsu,” 
pp.17–18.
27  FO228/2606 D34/07 Sir Claude MacDon-
ald to JNJ Telegram No.4, 29 October 1907; 
ibid., Enclosure 2 in Sir C. MacDonald’s 
No.241 of 29 October 1907.
28  FO228/2606 D20/07 Sir John N. Jordan 
to Mr. Lowther, June 1, 1907; ibid., Claude 
M. MacDonald to Sir Edward Grey No.241, 
29 October 1907. 
29 FO228/2606 Enclosure 4 in Sir Claude 
MacDonald’s No.241 of 28 & 29 October 
1907.
ANGLO-JAPANESE TRADEMARK CONFLICT IN CHINA 15
ish trademarks registered in Japan from infringement or misuse by Japanese 
firms.30 Besides British trademarks registered in Japan, the British government 
officially enquired of the Japanese government whether the Japanese authori-
ties in China and Korea would protect British trademarks unregistered in 
Japan and only used in China and Korea. If not, did British trademark owners 
have to register their trademarks in Japan?31 Since there was no effective 
trademark registration system in China and Korea, the British government had 
no other choice but to make this enquiry. The Japanese government again 
sent back an unsatisfactory reply. It refused to accept the British draft of the 
mutual convention because it treated Korea (which by that point had become 
a Japanese protectorate) as equal to China where the extraterritorial rights 
of both countries were in force. However, considering the importance of a 
mutual convention for protecting trademarks in China, Komura Jutarō, the 
Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, guaranteed that the Japanese authorities 
in China would protect British trademarks even if they were not registered in 
Japan, on the condition that the British government abandoned its extrater-
ritorial rights in Korea, just as the US, French, and German governments had 
done.32 In return, as evidence of their sincerity, the Japanese government 
revised its trademark law to accept several requests by the British govern-
ment: they reduced the registration fee, partially adopted the principle of 
first-to-use and stopped requiring plaintiffs to prove that their trademarks had 
been registered in Japan prior to being infringed upon.33
The Japanese government’s efforts did not dispel the doubts of the British 
government. Although Komura officially replied that, “it goes without saying 
that Japan, having joined the International Commission for the Protection 
of Industrial Property [the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property], is bound by the obligation imposed under the provisions of Article 
8 of that Convention”, namely a provision for the protection of trade names 
without necessity of registration. He also stated that neither in Japan nor in 
Korea were there any special provisions of law relating to the protection of 
British trademarks unregistered in Japan, except in the case of trademarks in 
use prior to the operation of the old Commercial Law of 1893. This exception, 
however, did not appear to the eyes of the British diplomats to afford any 
protection to British unregistered trademarks in use before 1894. It merely 
stipulated that the owners of the unregistered British trademarks could not face 
legal proceedings from a user of a similar name, which had been registered.
British diplomats in Japan did not believe that the Japanese government 
would punish a Japanese citizen who had improperly used an unregistered 
trademark of a British firm in China, even if the British government did 
sign a mutual convention along these lines, or even restrain him from such 
improper use, in spite of Komura’s reply.34 Accordingly, the British govern-
ment gave up on negotiations with the Japanese government for the mutual 
protection of the trademarks of both countries in China.
The Collapse of the Trademark Deposit System  
and its Aftermath, 1909–14
At about the same time as the negotiations between the British and 
Japanese governments were ending in failure, Japanese industrial firms in 
China suffered from trademark infringement by Chinese firms. An important 
trademark infringement case from this period was Kanegafuchi Bōseki 鐘ヶ
淵紡績 v. Youxin gongsi 又新公司 (1909). In dealing with an infringement 
on Kanegafuchi Bōseki’s “Rangyo” 藍魚 brand (see Figure 3) by Youxin 
30  FO228/2608 Claude MacDonald to John 
N. Jordan: Counter Draft of Convention 
for reciprocal protection of Trademarks in 
China and Corea [sic.], 4 September 1908. 
31 FO228/2608 Claude M. MacDonald to 
Edward Grey No.233 with 2 Enclosures, 
12 September 1908. 
32 FO228/2609 Claude M. MacDonald to 
Edward Grey No.21, 3 February 1909. 
33 FO228/2609 Claude M. MacDonald to 
Edward Grey No.78, 31 March 1909. 
34  FO228/2609 D50 Horace Rumbold to Sir 
John Jordan, 25 September 1909. 
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gongsi, Mushanokōji Kintomo 武者小路公共, a Japanese diplomat, care-
lessly allowed Sheng Xuanhuai 盛宣懐, the owner of the Chinese firm (and 
important official and modernizer in the late Qing period—at the time, 
minister of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce) to use the revised imita-
tion brand (see Figures 4 and 5). This was in spite of prohibiting him from 
using any trademark with a similar design to the original Rangyo, or “blue 
fish”. Chinese government officials and merchants regarded this action as 
the Japanese government granting permission to Chinese firms to openly use 
similar designs to the trademarks of Japanese firms. From then on, quite a 
few Japanese firms had to struggle with Chinese firms to protect their right 
to use their own trademarks.35
Even under such unfavorable conditions, the Japanese government could 
still rely on the trademark deposit (Cun’an 存案) system, at least in Shanghai, 
to redress their grievances. Under the Cun’an system, whenever a foreign 
firm noticed a Chinese firm or merchant infringing their trademark, they 
could inform the Shanghai Daotai 道台 via the consulate of their own coun-
try and ask that a notice be issued to prohibit the imitation trademark. Once 
such a notice was issued, foreign firms could sue Chinese firms or merchants 
at the Mixed Court or Shanghai Magistrate for compensation. Although this 
system was only valid within the Shanghai district, the economic center of 
China, it was effective for Japanese firms.36 However, after the Xinhai revo-
lution 辛亥革命 the new government decided to retire the Cun’an system, 
doing nothing to protect the trademarks of Japanese firms, no matter how 
many times the Japanese consul-general, Ariyoshi Akira 有吉明, requested 
it to do so. The government simply replied that he should wait until a new 
trademark law had been promulgated.37
When the Beijing 北京 government finally showed the Draft of Rules and 
Regulations of Trademark Registration (Zhongguo shangbiao tiaoli caoan 
中国商標条例草案) to diplomats in April 1914, the entire corps was disap-
pointed.38 The most unsatisfactory point for the British government was 
that there were no provisions for protecting old trademarks of British firms 
that had been used in China since 1842. This was because the draft was 
largely adapted from the Japanese trademark law of 1909: it did not adopt 
the first-to-use principle in China, as requested by the British government 
in 1905, instead of the first-to-file principle.39 These grievances were shared 
by the US government.40 In addition, the French and Russian governments 
opposed the draft because the Chinese government did not allow their con-
suls to take part in judging foreign trademarks with pending applications for 
registration.41 Even the Japanese government, whose trademark law of 1909 
was substantively adopted, did not entirely approve of the draft because it 
did not explicitly mention trademarks such as those provisionally registered 
in Tianjin or Shanghai Maritime Customs, or deposited at Shanghai Dao-
tai’s office before the Xinhai revolution.42 As it turned out, negotiations for 
revising the Draft of Rules and Regulations of Trademark Registration were 
postponed due to the outbreak of the First World War.43 Consequently, many 
Japanese firms had to endure trademark infringement by Chinese merchants 
and firms until the end of the Great War.44
The Second Anglo-Japanese Negotiations on Trademark 
Regulation, 1913–23
Like many prominent Japanese industrial firms, British firms in China 
in this period frequently suffered from trademark infringement by Chinese 
firms and merchants. They requested that the Chinese government issue a 
35  For a full detailed outline of this case 
and its aftermath, see my “Shinmatsu Minsho 
ni okeru shōhyōken shingai funsō — 
Nicchū kankei wo chūshin ni” [“Conflict 
Over Sino-Foreign Trademark Violation 
in the Late Qing and Early Republican 
Periods: With Special Reference to Japa-
nese and Chinese Companies”], Shakai-
Keizaishigaku [Socio-Economic History] 
75.3 (September 2009): 5–13.
36  NGK  3.5.6.15. Official No.239 Ukita 
Gōji 浮田郷次 to Komura Jutarō, 17 August 
1911. An English translation is available in 
FO228/2610 1, A Printed Circular No.1 of 
1909, 26 January 1909.
37  NGK 3.5.6.15. Official No.221, Ariyoshi 
Akira 有吉明 to Uchida Kōsai 内田康哉, 
19 July 1912; ibid., Official No.28, Ariyoshi 
Akira to Katsura Tarō 桂太郎, 18 January 
1913; ibid., Official No.116 Ariyoshi Akira 
to Makino Nobuaki 牧野伸顕, 20 March 
1913; ibid., Official No.87 Makino Nobuaki 
to Ariyoshi Akira, 26 May 1913; ibid., Official 
No.454 Ariyoshi Akira to Makino Nobuaki, 
13 November 1913. 
38  IMH 03-18-116-(01)-1-16 Nongshangbu 
guan yijian 農商部函一件, 24 April 1914; 
FO228/2610 D35 Wai-Chiao-Pu 外交部 
to the Dean, 29 April 1914; NGK 3.5.6.15. 
Official Nos.148, 152, Yamaza Enjirō 山座
圓次郎to Katō Takaaki, 6 May 1914. 
39  FO228/2610 D39 John N. Jordan to Sir 
E. Grey No.207, 22 May 1914.
40  FO228/2610 D84 Enclosure in J.V.A. 
MacMurray to Ker, 1 August 1914.
41  IMH   03-18-116-(01)-1-19, Fa kangshi zha-
ohui yijian 法康使照会一件, 24 May 1914; 
NGK 3.5.6.22. Confidential No.247 Hioki 
Eki 日置益 to Katō Takaaki, 4 August 
1915. 
42  NGK 3.5.6.15. Special Permission 
No.76, Ōura Kanetake to Katō Takaaki, 
16 July 1914. 
43  NGK 3.5.6.22. Confidential No.79, Hioki 
Eki to Katō Takaaki, Mar. 18, 1915. 
44  See my “Shinmatsu Minsho ni okeru 
shōhyōken shingai funsō” pp.7–13. 
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Figure 3
“Rangyo 藍魚 (Blue Fish)” brand of 
Kanegafuchi Bōseki
Source: NGK 3.5.6.8. Official No. 86, 
Mushanokōji Kintomo 武者小路公
共 to Komura Jutarō 小村寿太郎, 
1 March 1908
Figure 4
Imitation trademark of "Blue Fish” 
brand by Youxin Gongsi.
Source: NGK 3.5.6.8. Official No. 86, 
Mushanokōji Kintomo to Komura 
Jutarō, 1 March 1908
Figure 5
Revised imitation trademark of 
Youxin Gongsi.
Source: NGK 3.5.6.8. Official No. 86, 
Mushanokōji Kintomo to Komura 
Jutarō ,1 March 1908
18 EIICHI MOTONO
notice to prohibit trademark infringement or improper use of the names of 
British firms or cities after the Xinhai revolution, and the Chinese govern-
ment readily acceded to their request.45 In contrast to the Japanese govern-
ment, the British government never yielded to the Chinese claim to admit 
imitation trademarks. In each of the trademark infringement cases between 
British and Chinese firms listed in Table 2, the British consulates succeeded 
in protecting the trademarks of British firms. Therefore, the writer of the 
memorandum could afford to claim that, under present conditions, cases of 
infringement of foreign marks and labels were perhaps more satisfactorily 
dealt with on broad grounds of equity than they would be if tested by the 
strict technicalities of a modern code of registration law.46
With that being the case, why did the British government change its atti-
tude and restart negotiations with the Japanese government on a trademark 
law in China at this time? It obviously considered that the activities of the 
Sino-Japanese groups who manufactured counterfeits and infringed upon the 
trademarks of British firms could no longer be neglected. In contrast to the 
time when Ozaki Nobumori had reported to the Japanese government in 1907, 
Japanese manufacturers were clearly no longer merely the thoughtless agents 
of “cunning Chinese merchants”, especially after 1915 when the first large 
anti-Japanese goods boycott took place in order to protest against the Twenty-
One Demands of the Japanese government. The boycott caused Japan’s total 
exports to fall from 162,370,000 taels in 1914 to 141,120,000 taels in 1915.47 
Although this might seem a relatively small reduction, it must have felt like a 
serious threat to the Japanese manufacturers. In order to avoid being the target 
of the anti-Japanese goods boycott, they manufactured counterfeits of Western 
products and sold them through the commercial network of “cooperative” 
Chinese merchants in China.48 However, as the following two cases, which 
took place in northern China during the First World War indicate, the relation-
ship between Japanese manufacturers and “co-operative” Chinese merchants 
was not as simple as one might think. 
1. British-American Tobacco Co. Ltd. (China) v. Sanlin Gongsi  
三林公司 (1913–15)
This case started in October 1913 when British-American Tobacco Co. 
Ltd. (China) (hereafter BAT) demanded from the Japanese consulate in Feng-
tian 奉天 that the Japanese tobacco firm Sanlin Gongsi cease production of 
the Peafowl cigarette brand, which was similar to their own Peacock brand 
(see Figure 6, Peafowl on the right, Peacock on the left).49 Since the Peafowl 
brand was an unregistered trademark in Japan, whereas the Peacock brand 
had been registered in Japan (no. 15681), and BAT had purchased it from 
the original owners Murai kyōdai shōkai (Murai Brothers Co.) 村井兄弟商会
in 1904, BAT demanded the Japanese consulate prohibit Sanlin Gongsi from 
using the Peafowl brand.50 The Japanese consul in Fengtian did not yield 
to this demand easily. He pointed out that BAT had been putting pressure 
on Chinese dealers only to sell their own tobacco or cigarettes by providing 
them with various rewards. He felt that the purchase of the Peacock brand 
was a result of pressure on the Japanese tobacco manufacturing company. 
Therefore, claiming that there was no mutual convention for protecting 
trademarks in China, he refused their request.51 Even though his superiors in 
Beijing and Tokyo 東京 tried to persuade him to yield to the BAT’s request, 
he never succumbed to the pressure.52
This case seemed to be an attempt by BAT to protect their products 
from Japanese counterfeits, BAT not hesitating to purchase the right to use 
45  FO228/2751 D33 E. Fraser to John N. 
Jordan No.227 with 1 Enclosure, 9 August 
1916; ibid., D37 John N. Jordan to F.O. 
No.273, 30 September 1916. 
46  FO228/2751 D37 Memorandum: Trade-
marks in John N. Jordan to F.O. No.273, 
30 September 1916. 
47  Kikuchi Takaharu, Chūgoku minzoku 
undō no kihon kōzō- taigai boikotto undō 
no kenkyū [The Historical Background of 
the Chinese National Movement: A Study 
of Anti-foreign Boycotts in Modern China] 
(Tokyo: Kyūko Shoin: 1974), pp.163–73; 
Karl Gerth, China Made: Consumer Culture 
and the Creation of the Nation (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2003), pp.133–57.
48  See my “Shinmatsu Minsho ni okeru 
shōhyōken shingai funsō,” pp.13–21. 
49  FO228/2610 Enclosures Nos. 1 and 2 in 
Mr. O’Brien-Butler No.4 of 19 January 1914, 
28 & 29 October 1913. 
50  NGK 3.5.6.2. Special No.254 Sakigawa 
Saishirō 崎川才四郎to Sakata Jūjirō坂田重
次郎, 27 December 1913.
51  NGK 3.5.6.2. Confidential No.260 Ochiai 
Kentarō 落合謙太郎 to Makino Nobuaki, 
Nov. 19, 1913; ibid. Confidential No.175 
Makino Nobuaki to Ochiai Kentarō, 
29 December 1913; FO228/2610 Enclo-
sure No.4 in Mr. O’Brien-Butler’s No.4 of 
19 January 1914, 15 January 1914; ibid., 
D29 John N. Jordan to Japanese Minister, 
29 January 1914. 
52  NGK 3.5.6.2. Confidential No.92 Yamaza 
Enjirō 山座圓次郎 to Makino Nobuaki, 2 
March 1914; ibid. Confidential No.44 Ochiai 
Kentarō to Makino Nobuaki, 11 March1914; 
ibid. Confidential No.29, Makino Nobuaki 
to Consul Ochiai, 16 March 1914; ibid., 
Confidential No.57 Consul Ochiai to Foreign 
Minister Makino, 24 March 1914. 
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Table 2
List of trademark infringement cases between British and Chinese firms, 1913 to 1915
Name of case Year Place
Lever Brothers “Sunlight” Soap v. Hua Chang Co. 1913–14 Beijing
Lever Brothers “Sunlight” Soap v. Chemoo 1914 Zhenjiang
Lever Brothers “Sunlight” Soap, Gossage “Beehive” 
Soap v. He Mao 和茂 1914–16 Nanjing
Lever Brothers “Sunlight” Soap, Gossage “Beehive” 
Soap v. He Mao 和茂 1914 Qinan
Lever Brothers “Sunlight” Soap, Gossage “Beehive” 
Soap v. He Mao 和茂 1915 Zhenjiang
Lever Brothers “Sunlight” Soap, Gossage “Beehive” 
Soap v. Tonmoo Soap 1915 Hankou
Lever Brothers “Sunlight” Soap, Gossage “Beehive” 
Soap v. Han liyuan 咸利元 1915–16 Nanjing
Infringement against Gossage Soap by unknown 
Chinese 1914 Zhifu, Fuzhou
Infringement against Gossage Soap by unknown 
Chinese 1915 Xiamen
Price’s Candles v. Taiyuen Co. 1915 Zhenjiang
Forgery of candle of Asiatic Petroleum Co. 1915 Ningbo
Forgery of “Pirate” cigarette of British American 
Tobacco Co. 1914–15 Xiamen, Hankou
Forgery against Hutley & Palmers’ Biscuits 1914 Xiamen
Forgery against Anglo-Swiss Co. 1914 Xiamen
Infringement against Loxley & Co.’s trademark 1915 Xiamen
Forgery against Dr Williams’s Pink Pills 1916 Ningbo
Lever Brothers “Sunlight” Soap v. Ting Feng & Co. 1914 Shanghai
Lever Brothers “Sunlight” Soap v. Chung Hua  
Printing Company 1915 Shanghai
Caldbeck, Macgregor & Co. v. Li Yungchi 1915 Shanghai
False packing of British American Tobacco Co. 
product 1915 Shanghai
Source: FO228/2751 D37 Memorandum and Appendix in John N. Jordan to 
F.O. No.273, Sept. 30, 1916.  
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trademarks from Japanese rival companies in order to eliminate counterfeits 
or similarly designed packages in China.53 However, it was the anti-Japanese 
goods boycott movement in China that resolved the case in favor of BAT. 
Taking advantage of the change, BAT could eliminate the Japanese Peafowl 
brand from the Chinese market simply by issuing an advertisement that 
their Peacock brand had nothing to do with Japanese Peafowl cigarettes.54 
However, even after the case, Japanese counterfeits continued to infringe 
on BAT’s cigarette brands, as they still had to issue a large advertisement 
to warn consumers not to buy counterfeit goods seven years later (see 
Figure 7).55 
2.  J.P. Coats of Paisley v. Yongxiang hang 永祥行
This case was a typical example of a Chinese firm, which employed a 
Japanese manager, Imamura Jisaku 今村治作 to disguise their factory as a 
Japanese firm so that they could conceal their trademark infringement. The 
Chinese firm “T’ung Fa Hsiang” (Chinese characters unknown), in New-
chwang 牛庄 (now Yingkou營口), manufactured cotton thread with an 
imitation trademark — the “Boy and Giraffe” brand — in its Yongxiang fac-
tory and sold it in Harbin and Newchwang. They produced 25 to 30 gross of 
the cotton thread per day, and could earn 7 taels of profit per gross.56 Since 
the “Boy and Giraffe” brand was apparently similar to the famous “Bear” 
brand of the British company J.P. Coats of Paisley (although no samples of 
either exist in the sources), a complaint was made to the Chinese govern-
ment, asking it to prohibit the Yongxiang factory from using the Boy and 
Giraffe brand. However, the Chinese government refused the request, claim-
ing that the factory was a Japanese firm. However, the British consulate in 
Newchwang proved that the firm was genuinely Chinese. According to the 
consulate’s investigation, it was not only founded with Chinese capital and 
53  Sherman Cochran, Big Business in 
China: Sino-Foreign Rivalry in the Ciga-
rette Industry, 1890-1930 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1980), pp.40–1.
54  NGK 3.5.6.2. Official No.189, Ochiai 
Kentarō to Katō Takaaki, 4 August 1915. 
55  FO228/3375 G.A. Fox to J.N. Jordan 
No.6, 4 February1920. 
56  FO228/3375 6937/18/24 Walter J. Clennell 
to John N. Jordan No.66, 21 October 1918.
Figure 6
"Peacock" brand and "Peafowl" 
brand. Source: NGK 3.5.6.8. 
Confidential No.260, Ochiai Kentarō
落合謙太郎 to Makino Nobuaki 
牧野伸顕,19 November 1913
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employed a Chinese general agent, but also emphasized to consumers that 
its goods were Chinese products. The employment of Imamura was merely 
camouflage.57 As evidence, they quoted one of the firm’s advertisements, 
which emphasized that its factory had been equipped at great expense with 
specially imported European machinery of all kinds, and had invited foreign 
experts to select and produce goods of the highest quality. This had been 
done with the object of producing first class thread, not with a view to profit, 
but because their ancestral land of China had long been flooded with daily 
increasing quantities of foreign goods whose influx could not be stayed 
without a determined effort to wrest back the advantage.58
The British government was concerned that the Yongxiang factory would 
register its “Boy and Giraffe” brand with the Japanese Patent Bureau through 
Imamura before J.P. Coats of Paisley had the chance to register its “Bear” 
brand.59 However, after confirming that J.P. Coats had already registered its 
“Bear” brand in 1897 with the Japanese Patent Bureau (no.88145), the British 
government asked the Japanese government to protect the “Bear” brand from 
being infringed upon by T’ung Fa Hsiang. The request was refused, the Japa-
nese government claiming that there was no mutual convention with the Brit-
ish government to protect the trademarks of both countries’ subjects in China. 
Upon receiving this reply, the British felt it necessary to restart negotiations 
with the Japanese to protect British trademarks in China.60
Even at the heyday of the anti-Japanese goods boycott, there existed 
Chinese firms that used Japanese employees to conceal their trademark 
infringements under the cover of being Japanese firms, perhaps endorsing 
Ozaki Nobumori’s report of 1907. Whether the Chinese or the Japanese took 
the initiative, when they cooperated with each other to manufacture and to 
sell counterfeits of Western products, their activities were a serious menace 
to British firms in China. Under these circumstances, and with cases like J.P. 
Coats of Paisley v. Yongxiang hang in mind, the British government might 
well have asked the Japanese government to cooperate with it to establish 
the trademark protection system in China.61
Figure 7
Warning advertisement against 
Imitation Packaging by BAT.
Source: FO228/3375 G.A. Fox to  
J.N. Jordan No. 6, Dec. 4, 1920
57 FO228/3375 4901/18/25 Peking to 
Newchwang No.28, 5 November 1918; 
ibid., 8013/18/26 Walter J. Clennell to John 
N. Jordan No.76 and Enclosures 1 and 3 
in Newchwang, General Series, No.76 of 
13 December 1918.
58  FO228/3375 Enclosure 4 in Newchwang, 
General Series, No.76 of 13 December 1918. 
59  FO228/3375 Enclosure 2 in Newchwang, 
General Series, No.76 of 13 December 1918. 
60  FO228/3375 549/19/29 Walter Clennel 
to John N. Jordan, No.2, 10 January 1919; 
ibid., Enclosures 2 and 3 in Newchwang, 
General Series No.2 of 10 January 1919; 
ibid., H.B.M. Consulate-General, Shanghai 
to C.A.W. Rose, 22 January 1919; ibid., 
Walter Clennel to John N. Jordan No.4, 
23 January 1919. 
61  FO228/3375 1547/19/35 Commercial, 
Cunyngham Greene to J.N. Jordan No.27, 
27 January 1919.
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The Third Anglo-Japanese Negotiations, 1919–23
While proposing to the British that the Chinese government should solve 
the trademark problem by issuing their own regulations, the Japanese gov-
ernment also felt that it was time to deal with the trademark protection 
system in China in cooperation with the British government.62 As evidence 
of its sincerity, they agreed to persuade the Chinese government to adopt the 
draft of the trademark regulations drawn up by the Japanese government, 
based on the first-to-use principle that the British government had pro-
posed.63 Nevertheless, this was far from being a satisfactory compromise 
for the British. The Japanese still intended to preserve the priority of the 
provisionally registered or deposited Japanese trademarks, many of which 
included similar marks or forgeries of Western firms’ trademarks in China. 
If it succeeded in doing so, Japanese manufacturers could produce and 
export goods with forged or imitation trademarks or counterfeited products 
with the cooperation of their Chinese business partners. As evidence for 
this, the British could point out that the Japanese government still claimed 
that such Japanese trademarks should be treated as exceptions.64 The British 
government was not to be deceived. It informed the Japanese that it would 
treat any Japanese trademarks as non-registered trademarks under the new 
Chinese trademark regulations, regardless of whether they were provision-
ally registered with the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs in Tianjin or 
Shanghai or deposited at the Shanghai district.65 After that declaration, it 
never again consulted with the Japanese government on the draft of the 
trademark regulations, no matter how many times the Japanese government 
made official enquiries.66
The focus of the dispute between them can be seen in Clause 7 and 
Clause 13 of the British draft of the trademark regulations. The full text of 
these clauses are quoted with the revisions or additions proposed by the 
Japanese government underlined and in square brackets: 
Clause 7. No trademark shall be registered in respect of any goods or 
description of goods which is identical with one belonging to a different 
proprietor which is already on the Registrar, in respect of such goods or 
description of goods, or so nearly resembling such trademark as to be cal-
culated to deceive, with the following exceptions, which shall apply only 
in respect of applications to register made within one year from the date on 
which this law comes into force:-
If the trademark proposed to be registered was used as a trademark in China 
before the 1st January, 1890 [1903 and has since been continuously so used 
up to the present], by the applicant or his predecessors in business; or
If the applicant for registration or his predecessors in business have honestly 
used the trademark in China during the period of not less than ten years [five 
years] before the date on which this law comes into force without protest or 
objection from anyone claiming a prior or paramount right to the said mark 
or to a mark so nearly resembling it as to give ground for objection, but 
the Registrar may subject to appeal impose such conditions, amendments, 
modifications or limitations, if any, as to mode or place of user or otherwise, 
as he may think right to impose. 
[(c) If a trademark as to which an application in writing is made for registra-
tion is either one which has been deposited at the Ministry of Commerce or 
at the Daotai Yamen (i.e. Cun’an) or else one which has been registered at 
one of the Chinese Maritime Customs Stations for the last five years, except 
those trademarks regarding which the fact has been established that they 
have not continuously used after their deposit or provisional registration.]
62  FO228/3375 In Tokio [sic.] desp. to F.O. 
No.27 Commercial 30/1/19: Memorandum, 
27 January 1919; NGK 3.5.6.22. Confiden-
tial No.67 the Foreign minister, Uchida 
to the Japanese ministry in China, Obata, 
26 February 1919; ibid., Confidential No.214 
Obata Yūkichi 小幡酉吉 to Uchida Kōsai, 
23 August 1919. 
63  NGK 3.5.6.22. Confidential No.127, the 
Foreign Minister, Uchida to the minister 
of Agriculture and Commerce, Yamamoto, 
16 June 1919. 
64  NGK 3.5.6.22. Special Permission 
No.319, Yamamoto Tatsuo to Uchida Kōsai, 
30 October 1919; ibid., Confidential No.50 
the Foreign Minister Uchida to the Japanese 
ministry in China, Obata, 7 May 1920. 
65  NGK 3.5.6.22. Confidential No.477, Obata 
Yūkichi to Uchida Kōsai, Dec. 4, 1920; ibid., 
No.112 the Foreign Minister, Uchida, to the 
Japanese Ambassador in Britain, Hayashi, 
17 March 1922; ibid., Ambassador Hayashi to 
the Foreign Minister, Uchida, 31 March 1922; 
ibid., Confidential No.161 Yoshida Isaburō 
吉田伊三郎 to Uchida Kōsai, 24 April 
1922; FO228/3375 11809/20/11 Enclosure 
No.2 in Sir E. Fraser’s Despatch No.261 of 
29 November to Peking, 23 July 1920. 
66  NGK 3.5.6.22. Deputy Chief of Com-
merce, Matsuda 松田, to Hugh Horne, 
21 October 1919; ibid. Nakamatsu Shinkyō 
中松真卿, to the first chief of the commerce 
department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Saitō 斎藤, 24 March 1920; ibid., Tel. No.299 
the Japanese ambassador in Britain, Chinda
珍田, to the Foreign Minister, Uchida, 11 
August 1920; ibid. Confidential No.112 the 
Foreign Minister, Uchida to the Minister of 
Agriculture and Commerce, Yamamoto, 
17 August 1920; ibid., Special Permission 
No.259, Yamamoto Tatsuo to Uchida Kōsai, 
1 October 1920. 
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Clause 13. Where each of several persons claims to be proprietor of the 
same trademark or of nearly identical trademarks in respect of the same 
goods or description of goods, and to be registered as such proprietor, 
otherwise than under Section 7, the Registrar shall determine the rights of 
the parties and in so doing shall have regard to the date of first-to-use the 
mark in China, and the state of knowledge in the particular trade as to the 
proprietorship of the trademark. 
In the case of honest concurrent users, or of any special circumstances 
which, in the opinion of the Registrar, make it proper so to do, the Registrar 
may permit the registration by another applicant of such a trademark or of 
a nearly identical trademark for the same goods or description of goods 
subject to such conditions, and limitations, if any, as to mode or place of 
user or otherwise as the Registrar may think it right to impose.
[With regard to the application of this clause to those trademarks which 
have been deposited or provisionally registered in China before the coming 
into force of the present draft Law, it shall be presumed that these trade-
marks have continuously been used bona fide since the performance of the 
required formalities.]67
The object of the British government in this draft was to ensure the prior-
ity of the trademarks of British or other Western firms in China, or at least 
those which had been used since the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
and to exclude those of Japanese firms from China, many of which included 
similar designs to those of Western firms and resembled them by using 
the English language. However, had they admitted the amendments of the 
Japanese government, such problematic Japanese trademarks, would doubt-
lessly have survived in China. Thus, there was no chance that the British 
government would agree with the Japanese proposals. Officially informing 
the Japanese government that it would not agree in early January 1923, its 
third attempt to establish the trademark protection system in China with the 
cooperation of the Japanese government ended in failure.68 
The Birth of the Chinese Trademark Law, 1923–26
While the British government was drawing up the draft of the trade-
mark regulations and negotiating with the Japanese government, it underes-
timated the abilities of the Chinese government which had been preparing 
its own trademark registration system and trademark law. Since it regarded 
the Japanese government as its more important partner, it clandestinely 
leaked the draft of the trademark law to the Japanese government, even 
when it was still being examined by the Chinese congress in March 1923. 
The Chinese government unofficially informed its ally that it would estab-
lish a bureau of trademark registration in the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Commerce, branches of which would be set up in Tianjin and Shanghai. 
Moreover, the bureau would take on board the complete records of foreign 
firms’ patents and trademarks that had been provisionally registered with 
the Maritime Customs.69 
The most important articles of the Chinese trademark law and its detailed 
regulations were numbers 3 and 26. Taking the controversy between the 
British and the Japanese governments into consideration, the Chinese gov-
ernment steered a middle course. In Article 3 of the trademark law it was 
stipulated that when more than two persons applied for the same or a nearly 
identical trademark in respect of the same category good, the Registrar of the 
bureau would register the applicant according to the first-to-use principle. 
67  NGK 3.5.6.22. Enclosure in Confiden-
tial No.161 Yoshida Isaburō to Uchida 
Kōsai, 24 April 1922; ibid., Confidential 
No.24, the Foreign Minister, Uchida, to 
the Japanese Minister in China, Obata, 
3 March 1923; FO228/3376 3133/23/43 
British Draft of Chinese Trademark Law. 
Amendment proposed by the Imperial 
Japanese government. 
68  NGK 3.5.6.22. Confidential No.211, 
Obata Yūkichi to Uchida Kōsai, 5 March 
1923. 
69  NGK 3.5.6.22. Confidential No.229, 
Obata Yūkichi to Uchida Kōsai, 9 March 
1923. 
24 EIICHI MOTONO
However, if neither of the trademarks had been used before or if neither 
applicant could prove the origin of the usage of their trademarks, the Reg-
istrar of the bureau would register according to the first-to-file principle. 
In Article 26, it was stipulated that the Registrar of the trademark bureau 
would ask to examine the trademarks applied for and publish the successful 
trademarks in the Monthly Trademark Gazette (Shangbiao gongbao 商標公
報) within a certain time period. If no one protested or raised an objection 
claiming a prior or paramount right to the said mark within six months, the 
mark would be registered.70
Only after the Chinese congress passed the law and the Ministry of Agri-
culture and Commerce put it into force on May 9 did each member of the 
diplomatic corps receive two copies of the Chinese trademark law and its 
regulations.71 The corps as a whole, including Japan, refused to recognize 
it, claiming that it breached Article 7 of the Mackay treaty, Article 5 of the 
Supplementary Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Japan and 
China and Article 9 of the treaty for the extension of the commercial relations 
between the US and China.72
The real reason the British government opposed the Chinese trademark 
law and regulations was that the British were skeptical about whether or not 
they would be effective in preventing the activities of Chinese merchants 
and Japanese manufacturers from infringing on the trademarks of British 
firms in China.73 Suspicious of the abilities of the Chinese Registrar in the 
trademark bureau and the Chinese language level of the British merchants 
in China, the British ministry requested that the Chinese government employ 
experienced Western specialists in the trademark bureau as their examin-
ers, issue an English version of the Monthly Trademark Gazette and open 
a special court to deal with trademark infringement cases according to the 
Mixed Court System.74 The Chinese government agreed to accept the first 
and second requests as a compromise, but they rejected the last request as 
a breach of their sovereignty.75
While the British ministry was concentrating on negotiations with the 
Chinese government for revisions of the trademark registration system, they 
were left behind by the actions of other parties. First of all, the Japanese could 
no longer wait for the completion of negotiations between the diplomatic 
corps and the Chinese government for revising the trademark registration 
system and decided to recognize the Chinese trademark law even though 
other governments had not done so.76 Furthermore, as an even bigger blow 
to the British, foreign firms stopped respecting instructions from their minis-
tries not to register their trademarks with the Chinese trademark bureau, fear-
ing that Chinese firms and merchants would register the foreign trademarks 
(or imitations) before them. Consequently, foreign firms in China preferred 
to register their trademarks with the Chinese trademark bureau rather than 
carry out provisional registration at the Maritime Customs in Tianjin and 
Shanghai.77 Two key actors accelerated the process: BAT, which had most 
popular trademarks in China and major German firms, which had lost their 
extraterritorial privileges through defeat in the First World War. All of these 
companies decided to register their trademarks with the Chinese trademark 
bureau, after Japanese firms had registered theirs between October 1923 and 
June 1924.78 Table 3 indicates the numbers of foreign trademarks registered 
with the Chinese trademark bureau from May 1925 to January 1926.
While the British ministry wished to ensure the protection of British firms’ 
trademarks in China, whether they were registered with the Chinese trade-
mark bureau or not, its measures had little effect. Recognizing the irrevers-
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ible current, it became clear that the British would have to perform a U-turn 
and permit their firms to register trademarks with the Chinese trademark 
bureau at their own risk.79 Other members of the diplomatic corps and the 
British Chambers of Commerce in Shanghai and Manchester regarded this 
silent change of attitude as a sign that the British government would recog-
nize the Chinese trademark law and its trademark registration system in the 
near future. Consequently, they decided to recognize the Chinese trademark 
law and its trademark registration system.80 
The Japanese government had officially recognized the law in October 
1925, turning a deaf ear to the British government’s appeal not to do so,81 
and it was followed by other Western governments, from May to September 
1926.82 Realizing that there was no point in continuing to stand alone, the 
British government finally decided to recognize the Chinese trademark law 
and its trademark registration system at about the same time.83 This was the 
end of its struggle to protect British trademarks against Japan and China. 
Conclusion
The Chinese trademark law of 1923 did not come about because of the 
development of Chinese capitalism, as is assumed by Chinese historians. In 
fact, it was a response by the Chinese government to the struggle between 
the British and the Japanese governments for mastery of the Chinese import 
trade in the early twentieth century. The essence of the struggle between 
Table 3
The numbers of foreign trademarks registered in the Chinese 
Trademark Bureau from May 1923 to January 1926
Dec. 1925 Jan. 1926 May 1923 – Jan. 1926
Great Britain 227 59 4365
Japan 16 14 2674
China 31 40 2180
Germany 153 14 2058
USA 24 19 1670
France 77 2 207
Switzerland 3 0 203
Holland 10 1 102
Sweden 0 1 98
Russia 20 0 20
Canada 1 0 15
Italy 1 0 10
Norway 0 0 10
Miscellaneous 0 0 35
TOTAL 563 150 13647
Source: NGK 3.5.6.22. Commerce No. 64 KatōNichikichi to Tanabe Teruo,  
26 April 1926.   
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the two countries was how to manipulate the “co-operative” Chinese mer-
cantile network or how to prevent its activities. In this struggle, it was the 
Japanese side that took the initiative. Seriously considering the infancy of 
Japanese industry, and the character of the Chinese who had infringed on 
foreign trademarks or commissioned Japanese manufacturers to produce 
imitations of Western firms’ products since the 1890s, the Japanese had 
gradually become aware of how to manipulate this network. Although it is 
difficult to reconstruct the process from the extant documents, the Japanese 
government and Japanese firms also gradually became aware of the effect 
of the first-to-file principle, at the latest from the end of the 1890s onwards. 
Since the Japanese trademark law of 1899, which had adopted the principle 
of first-to-file, ensured the legitimacy of trademarks if no one protested or 
raised an objection against their registration within three years, some Japa-
nese and Chinese merchants regarded it as a device to protect their dubious 
trademarks, which were imitations of the trademarks of Western firms or 
were counterfeit versions.
Once the Japanese succeeded in having the Chinese government put a 
trademark law based on the Japanese model into force, and once Japanese 
firms were able to register their trademarks with the Chinese government 
before Western firms did, the Japanese forgeries or counterfeits were able 
to obtain legitimacy instead of the Western originals. This enabled some 
Chinese merchants and Japanese manufacturers to build a stable bridgehead 
to undermine the superiority of Western firms in China. Thus, the Japanese 
government attached great importance to the first-to-file principle.
By contrast, the British firms and government sought to protect the prior-
ity of their own trademarks, which had prevailed in China since the latter 
half of the nineteenth century. Contrary to the Japanese government, since 
they never permitted Chinese firms to use even a slightly revised trademark 
or a similar design to the original, they did not need the Chinese trademark 
law. Only by demanding Chinese authorities issue a prohibition against such 
dubious trademarks could they protect the originals. What the British were 
most worried about were Japanese imitation manufacturers who sold coun-
terfeits through Chinese merchants. Concerned that the popularity of British 
brands would be irrevocably undermined, the British government had to 
consult with the Japanese government in order to establish a mutual conven-
tion, or to request the Chinese government to adopt a trademark law with the 
first-to-use principle, the draft of which the British and the Japanese were to 
draw up. However, because the final goals of both countries were opposed 
to each other, it was quite natural that these attempts ended in failure.
The Chinese trademark law of 1923 was a response from the Chinese 
government to this struggle; their attempt to satisfy both the British and the 
Japanese is reflected in Articles 3 and 26. Did this attempt succeed in putting 
an end to the Anglo-Japanese struggle? As the Chinese government in Beijing 
was defeated and ceased operation in 1927, the law was only in effect for a 
short period, so what happened to the foreign trademarks registered with the 
Chinese trademark bureau after the establishment of the Nationalist govern-
ment? This is the topic of my next research project, based on unpublished 
documents in Tokyo, Taipei and London that provide evidence for develop-
ments in this area until the early 1930s.
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